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I.
INTRODUCTION
'I have a copyright' is a challenge to the world. It denotes a property
right against all other conflicting rights and interests.' It is superior to all
* Lecturer in Law, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Centre, Herzliya, Israel;
Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank Leslie
Green for his invaluable comments and constructive criticism on earlier versions of this
Article. I would also like to thank Wendy J. Gordon, Mary Jane Mossman, Carys Craig,
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non-rights. Like property, the strength of the copyright title secures
excessive rights of use and exclusion. Lessons gleaned from what the right
to property is, 2 are important to the future development and understanding
of copyright. 3 In land law, for example, the extent of an owner's right is
captured by the principle that he who owns the land owns everything 'up to
the sky and down to the centre of the earth' .4 This means that the owner
also enjoys an exclusive right to the mines and minerals contained
underground.5 Although conceptual equivalents to mines and minerals are
not necessarily part of the bundle of rights in copyright, where the terms
'exclusion' and 'use' have different connotations, the law constantly
designing policies which enable the rightholder in copyright to claim a
robust right in his creative efforts. This tendency requires us to rethink the
wisdom behind, and remind ourselves the real meaning of the statement 'I
have a copyright'.
In order to properly analyse the entitlement structure in copyright,
conceptual reorganisation is required. In particular, in the age of vast
creative productivity and technological changes, it of prime importance to
ask from time to time what copyright comprises, and remind ourselves that
every allocation of a claim-right imposes duties on certain portions of
society, which sometimes implies far-reaching consequences that can
directly affect society as a whole. Copyright requires us to first understand
the nature of the right, then study its implications in order to ascertain what
copyright is and what it should be. One may argue that since copyright is a
powerful, bounded, and protected right, and is deeply ingrained and
enduring one, the question 'what copyright is?' can be simply answered. 6
Abraham Drassinower, Rosemary Coombe and Leslie Jacobs for their helpful suggestions
and comments.
I Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 (UK) s 1(1) provides that '[c]opyright is a
property right...' (emphasise added). I shall use the term property as a generic term and take
examples mainly from land law.
2 See for example, CM Rose, 'Property as the Keystone Right?' (1999) 71 Notre Dame
Law Review 329.
3 It is arguable that the intellectual property system would not have been emerged if we
did not have a legal and social history moulded by debates for and against the right to
property. However, Harris remarks that '[w]hether intellectual property could have emerged
in the absence of property over tangible resources constitutes an unanswerable
counterfactual speculation.' JW Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996) 46. For further discussion see, L Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright
Lockean' (2006) 29(3) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 891.
4 This is known as the Latin phrase: 'cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos'. See Corbett v Hill (1870) LR 9 Eq 671, 673.
5 This rule is subject to exceptions and for example, it does not cover coal and gas
found under land. These resources are now public property. See Petroleum (Production) Act
1934 s 1; Coal Industry Act 1994 s 9.
6 Libling argues that due to the differences between intangibles and tangibles, when we
discuss the former, we are to be concerned only with the right to commercial exploitation.
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In this article I argue that although the entitlement structure reflected
in copyright law almost perfectly mimics that of traditional property, its
social nature should render it a lesser form of property. 7 In practice,
however, copyright is a strong form of property, enough to destabilise its
delicate balance. Since modern copyright law evolved from historical
English laws on authors' rights, this article concentrates on English
copyright law and exposes its bare structure. This article is part of a larger
research arguing that copyright law has gone too far in the protection it
affords authors. We have a duty to society to stop for a moment and re-
examine the basics we seem to know but at the same time, ignore their
uncontrollable economic reach and societal effects.
II.
A BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
A. Rights and Boundaries of Tangibility
Associating copyright with property is attractive for many reasons. In
fact, 'those who started using the word property in connection with
inventions had a very definite purpose in mind: they wanted to substitute a
word with a respectable connotation, 'property', for a word that had an
unpleasant ring, 'privilege'.' 8 Similarly, a statement like 'copyright is
property' has its roots in the attraction of a private right to control an object
to the highest possible degree. As Blackstone once wrote: 'There is nothing
which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right to property; or that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.' 9
The right to copyright is the right to control the social and economic
agenda of an abstract entity, which implies its separation from a community
of similar entities, from the public domain. In copyright, as in property,
DF Libling, 'The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles' (1978) 94 Law Quarterly
Review 103, 104.
7 I further examine this issue in "The Copyright Moment" (2006) 43 San Diego Law
Review 247, and in "Towards a Conception of Authorial Knowledge in Copyright" (2006)
3(2) Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal 83.
8 F Machlup and E Penrose, 'The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century' (1950)
10 Journal of Economic History 1,16.
9 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Butterworth and son,
16th ed. 1825) bk 2, 1 (emphasis added). The desire we show when we talk property is
affected by the multi-faceted character of the property institution. This has brought some to
argue that the concept 'property' has 'so many variations and specialized uses that its
meaning has disintegrated'. TC Grey, 'The Disintegration of Property' in JR Pennock and
JW Chapman (ed.), Property, Nomos, XXII, (New York: New York University Press, 1980)
85.
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people are concerned with acquiring possessions and protecting mine and
thine, preserving the rightholder's exclusive possessions from trespassers.
Like private property, to have copyright is to have an exclusive title, which
confers on its owner the right to use, the right to exclude all others both
from use and possession, and the right to transmit use and possession to
others. It means that a private individual has the right to determine what
will be done with an object.'0 It embraces what is not common to all, but
controlled by a lesser number of people, whether one individual or more.11
In Property and Justice Harris argues that there is nothing like a full
property right, in his favourite parlance - 'full-blooded ownership'. 12 For
Harris, an object is capable of being property 'if either it is subject to
specific trespassory protection or if it is separately transmissible as part of a
person's private wealth.' 13 Harris treats the concept of trespassory rules as
the defining characteristic of property. It 'encompasses all rules which, by
reference to a resource, impose obligations (negative or positive) upon an
open-ended range of persons, there being expected some privileged
individual, group or agency.'1 4 Trespassory rules are central for discussions
of property and intellectual property. 15 Copyright laws are considered a
means to prevent trespassers - copiers and free-riders - from violating the
rights authors have in their protected works. As Woodmansee and Jaszi put
it: 'So important to us is this vision of intellectual property into mine and
10 Waldron defines property as 'the concept of a system of rules governing access to and
control of material resources.' J Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988) 31 (hereinafter - 'Waldron 1988').
Honor6 attempts to provide a list of the rights one can have by virtue of being the owner of
an object. He designs an argument comprising of eleven standard features, or incidents as he
calls them, of the 'liberal concept of full individual ownership': 'The right to possess' ('the
foundation on which the whole superstructure of ownership rests'); 'the right to use'; 'the
right to manage'; 'the right to income'; 'the right to the capital'; 'the right to security'; 'the
incident of transmissibility' (the heritability of the interest in the thing ad infinitum); 'the
incidence of absence in term' (no interest in the thing beyond the expired time); two social
limitations which are 'the duty to prevent harm' and 'liability to execution'; and 'residuary
character' (a right to the reversion of the rights comprised by lesser interests in the thing
upon the extinction of those interests). AM Honord, 'Ownership', in Making the Law Bind
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 166-179. Note that he does not explicitly include the right
to exclude in these incidents.
I I In the words of Reich: 'Property draws a circle around the activities of each private
individual or organisation. Within that circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than
without.' C Reich, 'The New Property' (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733, 771.
12 Harris (n 3 above) 29-32, 221-222, and 228-229.
13 Ibid 42 and 67-68.
14 Ibid 25. For Harris the institution of property is composed of 'the twin notions of
trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum'. Ibid 5.
15 In a recent article, BeVier examines the relationship between copyright, property and
trespassory rules and finds the latter useful for the resolution of disputes over conflicting
claims of access to copyrighted works. LR BeView, 'Copyright, Trespass, and the First
Amendment: An Institutional Perspective' (2004) Social Philosophy and Policy 104.
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thine that we have codified it in laws of copyright and authors' rights that
enable us to prosecute trespassers.' 16
Trespassory rules provide the great advantage of legally enforceable
physical and intangible boundaries. They are a powerful economic tool, and
provide the connection between rights and rewards. Rules of trespass
enforce the owner's strong right to exclude, which is complemented by, for
example, the rules of contract law and conveyancing, which also safeguard
the owner's right to transfer an object. The same applies to intellectual
property: 'By instituting trespassory rules whose content restricts uses of
the ideational entity, intellectual property law preserves to an individual or
group of individuals an open-ended set of use-privileges and powers of
control and transmission characteristic of ownership interests over tangible
items.' 17
As a property right, copyright is a relational right. It is not a right
between a person and an object but a right between people with respect to
objects. 18 That is, copyright, like property, is a matter of rights. 19 The right
itself is intangible, even where the object is tangible. Individuals tend to
lose track of the distinction between the physical relation between a person
and an object and between the normative - moral or legal - nature of
property that determines relationships between persons with respect to
things, because the two concepts are frequently conflated in everyday life.
This becomes, as Waldron puts it, our conversational habit.
20
Consequently, we can identify two different, but complementary,
senses of property. First, property as a set of legal relations. Second, in the
conversational sense, property as a thing, a res, which usually implies an
owner. A tenant may have a right to live in his rented apartment in a
building but not the right to sell it or if the tenancy agreement so specifies,
not to sublet it; the landlord may have the right to sell the building, but not
necessarily freely or without notice to enter the tenant's apartment.
Similarly, a flautist may play a new adaptation of Mozart's 'Jupiter'
16 M Woodmansee and P Jaszi, 'Introduction', in M Woodmansee and P Jaszi (eds.),
The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1994) 1, 2.
17 Harris (n 3 above) 44.
18 In the words of Cohen '[p]rivate property is a relationship among human beings such
that the so-called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to engage
in those activities and in either case secure the assistance of the law in carrying out his
decision.' FS Cohen, 'Dialogue on Private Property' (1954) 9 Rutgers Law Review 357, 373.
See also A Mossoff, 'What is Property: Putting the Pieces Back Together' (2003) 45 Arizona
Law Review 371, 429, n 241.
19 Many questions may emerge from the idea of property as a species of rights. For
example, whether we can now claim that all rights are property rights? See GF Gaus,
'Property, Rights and Freedom' (1994) 11 Social Philosophy and Politics 209, 211-216.
20 Waldron 1988 (n 9 above) 27-30.
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Symphony, but is not entitled to publicly perform the work or sell rights to
it.
However, possession of traditional property differs from that of
intangible property. Copyright is a species of incorporeal property while
traditional physical property can be 'touched'. Tangibility, however, as
Carter contends, 'is an accident; not all that is created can be touched.' 2 1
True, copyright protects abstract entities, and its boundaries are not
definable in physical terms, but, as Gordon asserts
Copyright provides its own boundaries which, by and large, substitute
well for physical boundaries, both in regard to promoting transactions and
to keeping liability within tolerable limits... Inevitably, the boundaries of
intangibles will be less precise than the metes and bounds of realty, and the
courts must be vigilant in enforcing copyright's limits lest the public be
"chilled" in its proper use of the unprotected aspects of the work.22
The law invented ways to clarify the distinction between traditional
property and copyright, proving that tangibility does not necessarily imply
lack of boundaries or that lack of boundaries does not imply weaker
protection of property. Tangibility, however, dictates a different set of
trespassory rules. This can be illustrated by the idea/expression dichotomy,
stipulating that copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the ideas
themselves. 23 Ideas, no matter how valuable or creative, are excluded from
the scope of copyright protection. Their consumption is non-rivalrous and
their benefits are non-excludable. This distinction, however, is not very
clear. 24 Laddie refers to it as a pithy catchphrase that may lead to
21 SL Carter, 'Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?' (1993) 68(2)
Chicago-Kent Law Review 715, 723.
22 W Gordon 'An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright' (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review
1343, 1381-1383 (hereinafter- 'Gordon 1989').
23 In Millar v Taylor, Yates J puts the matter this way: 'Ideas are free. While the author
confines them to his they are like birds in a cage, which none but he can have a right to let
fly: for, till he thinks proper to emancipate them, they are under his own dominion.' Millar v
Taylor (1769) 98 Eng Rep 201, 242. Similarly, Frankfurter J in Marconi Wireless Co v US,
remarks that great inventions and copyrighted works 'have always been part of an evolution,
the culmination at a particular moment of an antecedent process.. .the history of thought
records striking coincidental discoveries showing that the new insight first declared to the
world by a particular individual was in the air...' Marconi Wireless Co v US 320 US 1, 62
(1943) (Frankfurter J dissenting). True, the nature of an idea is that once 'let fly' it can be
used infinitely. My goal is to claim for the public a similar right to that of the author in the
expression.
24 Music, for example, more than any other form of modern culture, collapses the gap
between what separates idea from expression. Is the string of six notes that initiates 'Happy
Birthday to You' an idea, an expression, or both? Landes and Posner define a copyright
work as 'the joint output of two types of input, only one of which is protected by copyright
law.' WM Landes & RA Posner, 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law' (1989) 18
Journal of Legal Studies 325, 349.
For matters of argumentative clarity, it is of importance to note that by their nature
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confusion,25  and that 'philosophically speaking, there is no such
dichotomy.' 26 Although there must be a line between what is protectable in
copyright and what is not
[R]eferences to a supposed principle that copyright is confined to
expression does not assist in drawing that line. One must discover some
different principle in order to begin the task of drawing it. . .therefore: (a)
the proposition that copyright protection is confined to form of expression
is not to be found in any Act of Parliament; (b) it is, in its narrow sense,
unjust and has not been the law for many years; but (c) is the narrow sense
is jettisoned, what is left of the concept is no meaningful guide to
action. ..'27
Rosen challenges the inability to draw a distinction between idea and
expression. He advocates a distinction between a general idea and a specific
idea. He contends that 'there is no intrinsically "right place" to draw the line
between an idea and its expression. The distinction. . .is arbitrary.. .because
it is conventional, and it is conventional because it exists only where and
when we choose to employ it.' 28 Rosen recognises the role of the
dichotomy to ensure that ideas remain in the public domain, 29 that there are
no trespassory rules applicable to general ideas. 30 As Justice Jacob remarks:
'United Kingdom copyright cannot prevent the copying of a mere general
idea but can protect the copying of a detailed 'idea." 31
Despite the vagueness and difficulties in drawing a clear line between
the protectable components and the non-protectable components in a
copyrighted entity, it seems that there exists a division between what is
capable of being protected and what is not. A general idea can still be
separated from a more complex, detailed, and more developed idea. For
expressions are also non-rivalrous. Copyright law secures an exclusive right in expressions
notwithstanding that it is non-rivalrous, thereby creating false scarcity and rendering their
benefits excludable. As Harris explained: 'society's law have been extended to include those
trespassory rules which create artificial scarcity in unpublished and published ideas.' Harris
(n 3 above) 46.
25 Laddie et al, The Modem Law of Copyright and Designs (London: Butterworths, 3rd
ed. 2000) 3.76.
26 Ibid 3.77.
27 Ibid 3.77
28 A Rosen, 'Reconsidering the Idea/Expression Dichotomy' (1992) 26(2) University of
British Columbia Law Review 263, 280.
29 Ibid 270.
30 Rosen claims that the social aim of the idea/expression dichotomy can be promoted by
drawing a distinction between ideas and expression on the basis of (i) whether the given idea
is in a general form and can be further developed in ways that are likely to benefit the public;
and (ii) whether the given idea is already highly developed. Ibid 277. The danger in such a
formula is in placing judges as final arbiters of where social development starts and where it
ends.
31 Jacob J in Ibcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd [1994]
FSR 275, 302 (Ch).
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example, Rodin's sculpture The Kiss (1901-4), as an idea, is no more than a
work of two lovers kissing. But the actual work is not a general idea, it
reduces the banal idea of two lovers kissing to a more detailed expressive
idea. 32 Whether or not the line can be easily drawn it does not weaken the
argument that trespassory rules in copyright are important to define as
different from tangible property. Exclusivity in copyright has a different,
more limited, meaning and does not cover general ideas.
Furthermore, ideas are not scarce as tangibles, 33 and their benefits are
non-excludable, or, as Waldron puts it, these objects are 'non-crowdable'. 34
An object is crowdable if 'one person's use of it is an obstacle to at least
one other's use of it.' 35 For example, if I use the hoe to plant daffodils in
my garden, the hoe can be used only by me at the time. If I pick an acorn
and decide to crush it, I am the only person who could make this infinite
use of the acorn. The hoe and the acorn are crowdable objects in the sense
that the use I make of them precludes either temporary or absolute use by
others. In the realm of ideas, the fact that the law does not afford protection
to ideas, makes them non-crowdable in the sense that a person's use of an
idea would never amount to an interference with the freedom of another
person to use the same idea. While a poetry book or a painting are
crowdable objects, the lyrics of a song contained in the book or the idea to
portray sunrise not in yellow and red, are non-crowdable, as their use is no
obstacle to anyone. These ideas are non-rivalrous and do not preclude
others from using, utilizing or expressing them.
B. The Bundle
Copyright and property secure a bundle of rights for rightholders that,
32 Laddie explains: 'the law does not protect a general idea or concept which underlies
the work, nor any one fact or piece of information contained therein. However, a more
detailed collection of ideas, or pattern of incidents, or compilation of information' may
amount to a copyrighted work. Laddie (n 24 above) 3.79. Laddie also highlights the fact that
the detailed collection of ideas or information has to be reduced to writing or other material
form in order to be susceptible of copyright protection.' Ibid.
33 As Baird remarks: 'We typically can reap only the wheat we sow on our own land,
and how land becomes private property in the first place remains a mystery. In any event,
wheat and information are fundamentally different from one another. It is the nature of
wheat or land or any other tangible property that possession by one person precludes
possession by anyone else. A court must decide that A should get the wheat or that B should
get the wheat. It cannot decide that both get all of it. Many people, however, can use the
same piece of information.' DG Baird, 'Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy
of International News Services v Associated Press' (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law
Review 411, 413.
34 J Waldron, 'From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property' (1992-1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841, 870 (hereinafter -
'Waldron 1993')
35 Ibid 870-871.
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singly or collectively, define the relationship of an owner to a resource and
between the owner and other individuals. 36 Ownership is often referred to
as an 'abstract bundle of legal relations', 37 'a cluster-right' 38, 'a complex
aggregate of rights' 9, 'a range of ownership interests along the ownership
spectrum', 40 'complexes', 41 or just a label for a 'bundle of sticks'. 42 In
Heller's words 'private property can be defined in terms of a core bundle of
rights chosen from the infinite relations that may exist among people with
respect to a scarce resource.' 4 3 The fact that property constitutes a bundle of
rights does not mean that one can conclusively define it. As Penner remarks
On this view, "property is a bundle of rights" expresses the idea that
"property" is a concept that is not applied on the basis of some set of
necessary and sufficient criteria; rather, in a particular case the various
incidents or indicia of property may add up in some way, or show sufficient
resemblance to a paradigm, such that "property" is correctly applied to
describe it. Here, then, "property is a bundle of rights" asserts the claim that
property is a concept without a definable "essence"; different combinations
of the bundle in different circumstances may all count as "property" and no
particular right or set of rights in the bundle is determinative. This I call the
"conceptual" version of the thesis...44
The bundle of rights in copyright is highly fragmented and covers
36 Gray puts the matter this way: 'When I sell you a quantum of airspace the whole point
is that - apart from molecules of thin air - there is absolutely nothing there. The key is, of
course, that I have transferred to you not a thing but a 'bundle of rights', and it is the 'bundle
of rights' that comprises the property'. K Gray, 'Property in Thin Air' (1991) 50 Cambridge
Law Journal 252, 259.
Mossoff criticises the 'bundle' approach as applied to property and intellectual property for
its lack to conceptually unify the concept 'property'. Mossoff (n 17 above) 373-374. Instead,
he offers the integrated theory of property which, in general, ensembles together every
constituent of the right to property in order to 'represent a conceptual unity that together
serve to give full meaning to the concept of property.' Ibid 376. The integrated theory of
property encompasses exclusive rights to acquisition, use and disposal. Ibid. I am not in
dispute with Mossoff that fragmentation in property theory affects its conceptual tidiness,
and in fact submit that copyright is a prime example of a highly fragmented discipline.
37 M Heller, 'Symposium: Critical Approaches to Property Institutions: Three Faces of
Private Property' (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 417, 430.
38 J Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992) 55-7.
39 WN Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale University Press: 1919) 96
(hereinafter- 'Hohfeld 1919').
40 Harris (n 3 above) 86.
41 A Carter, The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights (New York and London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) 129.
42 Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164, 176 (1979). See also EL Rubin, 'Due
Process and the Administrative State' (1984) 72 California Law Review 1044, 1086.
43 M Heller, 'The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets' (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621, 665.
44 JE Penner, 'The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property' (1996) 43 UCLA Law Review
711,723.
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many different entitlements that affect the delicate stability of the system.45
As one commentator asserts: '[o]nce vested, the bundle of rights known
collectively as 'the copyright' gives the author the exclusive rights to
reproduce, to adapt, to distribute, to perform publicly and to display
publicly the copyrighted work.' 46 As such, in the words of Chafee:
'copyright is a bundle of distinct and specific monopolies' that suffers from
the 'Wide Range problem' of distinct monopolies. 47 These monopolies are
defined in the Act as exclusive rights.
48
Exclusivity of the 'bundle' in copyright has two meanings stemming
from two sets of rights: economic and moral. 4 9 The first set of rights
includes rights to reproduction (to make copies of the work),50 make
derivative works (eg, adaptations, translations and arrangements), 5 1 public
45 Many intellectual property scholars define copyright by analogy to the 'bundle of
rights' familiar to traditional property. See for example, ST Johnson, Note, 'Internet Domain
Name and Trademark Disputes: Shifting Paradigms in Intellectual Property' (2001) 43
Arizona Law Review 465, 475; BR Poquette, 'Information Wants to be Free' (2000) 22
Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 175, 179-181; OG Hatch, 'Toward a Principled
Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium' (1998) 59 University of
Pittsburgh Law Review 719, 721; J Lipton, 'Information Property: Rights and
Responsibilities' (2004) 56 Florida Law Review 135, 171-174.
Controlling the 'bundle' means that authors and artists can license 'less than her entire
bundle of rights to a licensee under terms consistent with the copyright laws'. MA Lemley,
'Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing' (1999) 97
California Law Review 111, 144.
46 DS Ciolino, 'Why Copyrights are not Community Property' (1999) Louisiana Law
Review 127, 133.
47 Z Chafee Jr, 'Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I' (1945) 45 Columbia Law
Review 503, 522.
48 CDPA 1988 s 2(l).
49 It was not until 1988 that moral rights were given explicit legislative form in British
law. See CDPA 1988, s 2(2)(a)-(c) and s 77-89. Pre-1988, copyright laws in England did not
acknowledge such moral rights, and other branches of law facilitated the underlying
principle of the moral right. Pre-1988 laws that facilitated the aim of a moral right were for
example, the torts of defamation, see Humphreys v Thompson (1905-1910) Mac CC 148; and
the law of passing-off. See Samuelson v Producers Distributing [1932] 1 Ch 201.
Interestingly, Vickers argues that the concept of moral rights are not at all a modem
invention. He writes that '[i]n the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Stationers'
Company protected the copyright of its members and adjudicated in many disputes.
However, as in ancient Rome, writers vigorously asserted their moral rights to their own
intellectual property, and despised plagiarism.' B Vickers, 'Abolishing the Author? Theory
versus History' Appendix II in B Vickers, Shakespeare, Co-Author (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002) 506, 519. He also asserts that '[t]he fact that writers could identify
the plagiarists' victim reinforces the dominant impression produced by this enquiry, that in
sixteenth- and seventeenth- century England an author was regarded as having a moral right
in his or her works, whether published or still in manuscript.' Ibid 525.
50 CDPA 1988 s 16(l)(a) and s 17.
51 CDPA 1988 s 16(1)(e) and s 21. See for example Redwood Music Limited v Chappell
& Co Ltd [1982] RPC 109.
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distribution52 , public performance and display,53 and the right to broadcast
the work.54 The second set of rights are moral rights that seek at least to
protect the integrity of a work and the author's connection with it. 55 This
set of rights includes the right to be identified as author or director, 56 and
the right to object to derogatory treatment of the work and that the work,
when performed or publicly displayed, is not mutilated,57 including the
right to privacy of certain photographs and films.58
Copyright's bundle of rights protects works of authorship invested in
different standards of creative manifestations. Classically, copyright works
have been 'literary and artistic works' - the creations of authors,
playwrights, composers, artists and film directors.59 It also protects
revolutionary works of authorship and modern art, computer programs and
compilations of information such as a timetable index and listing of
programmes to be broadcast,6 ° trade catalogues, 6' business letters,62
consignment notes, 63 street directories, 64 football fixture lists, 65 and a
racing information service. 66
52 CDPA 1988 s 16(l)(b) and s 18. Public distribution includes the capacity to rent or
lend the work to the public. Ibid s 16(l)(ba) and s 18A.
53 CDPA 1988 s 16(1)(c) and s 19.
54 CDPA 1988 s 16(l)(d) and s 20.
55 See generally G Dworkin, 'Moral rights in English Law - The Shape of Things to
Come (1986) European Intellectual Property Review 144; W Cornish, 'Moral Rights Under
the 1988 Act' (1989) European Intellectual Property Review 449; D Vaver, 'Moral Rights
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow' (1999) 7(3) International Journal of Law and Information
Technology 270.
56 CDPA s 77-79.
57 CDPA 1988 s 80-85.
58 CDPA 1988 s 85.
59 CDPA 1988 s 1() provides that copyright works are :'...(a) original literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic works; (b) sound recordings, films, broadcasts or cable
programme; and (c) the typographical arrangement of a published edition'. Literary work is
defined in s 3(1) as 'any work, other than a dramatic or musical works, which is written,
spoken or sung, and accordingly includes - (a) a table or compilation other than databases;
(b) a computer program; (c) preparatory design material for a computer program; and (d) a
database; 'dramatic work' includes a work of dance or mime; and 'musical work' means a
work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action intended to be sung, spoken or
performed with the music'. Chapter 1 of the CDPA 1988 further takes the types of works
that s I describes as constituting copyright works, and defines databases (s 3A), artistic
works (s 4), sound recordings (s 5A), films (s 5B), broadcasts (s 6 and s 7, including satellite
broadcasts), cable programmes (s 7) and published editions (s 8).
60 Blacklock v Pearson [1915] 2 Ch 376; Independent Television Publications v Time
Out [1984] FSR 64.
61 Collis v Carter (1898) 78 LT 613; Purefoy v Skyes Boxall (1955) 72 RPC 89 (CA).
62 British Oxygen Co Ltd v LiquidAir Ltd [1925] Ch 383
63 Van Oppen & Co Ltd v Van Oppen (1903) 20 RPC 617.
64 Kelly vMorris (1866) LR 1 Eq 697.
65 Football League v Littlewoods [1959] Ch 637.
66 Portway Press v Hague [1957] RPC 426.
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However, the bundle of rights in copyright differs from traditional
property in the way one comes to acquire rights. In property, as we know,
rights do not necessarily require one to invest money, effort or distinct
labour. One can acquire property by virtue of finding an unowned object or
picking an acorn. In copyright, protection is not as automatic as in property,
and any allocation of a right from the bundle of entitlements requires
meeting certain conditions. The making of copyrighted entities can be
viewed as a two-stage process. First, one acquires unowned properties such
as ideas and facts, then elaborates and expresses them in a way that
distinguishes them from prior works. In the seminal case of University of
London Press v University Tutorial Press, dealing with examination papers,
Peterson J defines 'literary work' in this way:
Under the Act of 1842, which protected "books", many things
which had no pretensions to literary style acquired copyright; for
example, a list of registered bills of sale, a list of foxhounds and
hunting days, and trade catalogues; and I see no ground for
coming to the conclusion that the present Act was intended to
curtail the rights of authors. In my view the words "literary
work" cover work which is expressed in print or writing,
irrespective of the question whether the quality or style is high.
The word "literary" seems to be used in a sense somewhat
similar to the use of the word "literature" in political or
electioneering literature and refers to written or printed matter.
Papers set by examiners are, in my opinion, "literary work"
within the meaning of the present Act.67
Protection is not granted automatically and 'skill judgement and
labour' 68 is a requirement that operates as a proviso de minimis.69 It is a
condition that requires that there must be 'a relation of creation between the
work and the author whatever this act of creation (sometimes only
67 Peterson J, in University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch
601,608.
68 See for example, Ladbrooke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 All
ER 465; Redwood Music v Chappell (n 50 above) 115; lbcos Computers v Barclays
Mercantile (n 30 above); Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Wilf Gilbert
(Staffordshire) Ltd [1994] FSR 723 (Ch); Reject Shop Plc v Manners [1995] FSR 870 (QB);
Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd (No 1) [1995] FSR 818 (Ch);
Bowater Windows Ltd v Aspen Windows Ltd [1999] FSR 759 (Ch); IPC Magazines Ltd v
MGN Ltd [1998] FSR 431 (Ch); Hi Tech Autoparts Ltd v Towergate Two Ltd (No 1) [2002]
FSR 15 (Patent County Court); Beckingham v Hodgens [2004] 6 ECDR 46 (CA). Or, as the
Canadian Court once remarked: 'work, taste and discretion'. Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed
Co v Sleep-King Adjustable Bed Co (1984)3 CPR (3d)81 (BCSC) 84-85.
69 It was held, however, that where calculating racing forecasts is a routine repetitive
task which involves feeding the relevant information into a computer, the activity does not
involve sufficient skill, labour or judgement for the formula for calculating the racing
forecasts to produce an original literary work each time. Bookmakers' Afternoon Greyhound
Services v Wilf Gilbert, ibid.
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presentation) means'. 70 Accordingly, courts may refuse to recognise works
as literary works in which the degree of literary composition is minimal. 7 1
Once skill and judgement are evident, the work has to qualify for the root
requirement of originality, 72 not in the sense of producing a novel work but
that the work has originated from its creator and was not copied from
another source. Peterson J holds:
The word 'original' does not in this connection mean that the work
must be the expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts
are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the expression
of thought, and, in the case of 'literary work', with the expression of
thought in print or writing. The originality which is required relates to
the expression of the thought. But the Act does not require that the
expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must
not be copied from another work - that it should originate from the
author.7
3
In the recent case of Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd74 the claimant, a
70 A Dietz, 'The Artist's Right of Integrity Under Copyright Law - A Comparative
approach' (1994) 25 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 177,
182. This condition, the court held, cannot be defined in advance as it must be examined on a
case-to-case basis. See Biotrading & Financing OY v Biohit Indutries Inc [1989] AC 217.
71 See for example, Kirk v Fleming [1928-1935] Mac CC 44. In this case the court
refused to grant copyright protection to an advertisement consisting of four commonplace
sentences. See also Rose v Information Services [1987] FSR 254. In Macmillan v Cooper,
concerned with copyright in textbooks containing excerpts from existing works with notes
for students, Lord Atkinson redefines and highlights the centrality of the requirement of
'labour skill and capital': 'To secure copyright for this product it is necessary that labour,
skill and capital should have been expended sufficiently to impart to the product some
quality or character which the raw material did not possess, and which differentiates the
product from the raw material.' Macmillar& Co Ltd v Cooper (1924) 40 TLR 186, 188.
72 CDPA 1988 s l(l)(a). The requirement for a literary work to be 'original' was first
added to the Copyright Act of 1911.
73 University of London Press v University Tutorial Press (n 66 above) 608. In the
Interlego case the defendant was trying to convince the Privy Council that there must be an
original creative input by the author and that the skill and labour is not that relevant. The
Court of Appeal rejected this argument referring to Peterson's J remark. Interlego AG v Tyco
Industries Inc [1989] AC 217, 259-260.
The inherent absurdity in the principle of originality is well illustrated by the Redwood case.
In that case the plaintiff claims copyright in various adaptations and arrangements made by
the defendant of an original song. A question arose as to the degree of skill and labour which
the arranger had to show he exercised in order to establish copyright in the arrangement.
Goff J accepted the defendant's submission that the degree of originality required means that
the manner of expression in permanent form is such that it can be regarded as have being
originated from the arranger rather than having being copied from the original, and subject to
that, an arrangement could attract copyright notwithstanding that it is no more than a
straightforward arrangement of a well known song. The Redwood case well illustrates how
little originality is required for copyright to subsist. In other words, building on existing
works and altering their arrangement is a basis for a valid claim of exclusive rights. Redwood
Music v Chappell (n 50 above).
74 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2004] 27 EMLR 542; [2005] RPC 4 (Ch).
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musicologist recognised as a leading authority on the French baroque
composer Lalande, sued a record company for infringement of copyright by
virtue of recording four works by Lalande. The defendant used editions of
the works prepared by the claimant. The claimant claimed royalties for
reproduction and distribution of the recordings on CD. Patten J held:
The amount of skill and labour necessary to establish a copyright
is not very large and is often expressed in negative terms ("not
insubstantial"). Nor need it involve inventive thought, although
the use of inventive thought is obviously likely to confirm the
originality of the work. What, however, the work need not be is
unique, and therefore in the case of a musical, just like a literary
work a rearrangement of an earlier work can easily give rise to a
copyright.. .The purpose of copyright is to protect from
misappropriation the skill and labour of the author which is
expended on the production of the original work.75
Award of any entitlement from the bundle of rights is dependent on
whether the alleged work complies with the requirement of originality. Yet,
this seems to be an easy task as originality is defined in the sense of
'originating from an author'. 76 This poses a conceptual problem. If I write a
poem and did not copy it from another source, then the work does not only
represent a thing that has been originated in me, but also, due to differences
between people, it contains a modicum of originality in the sense of
creating a different substance.
75 Ibid 564-565.
76 In comparative terms, the concept of originality has gone through many changes in
recent years. While English Courts remain steadfast on the original condition of skill, labour
and judgement, and their US counterparts require modicum of creativity, the Canadian
Supreme Court made an attempt to provide a mid-way solution - labour and skill that is
neither trivial nor mechanical in nature. Arguably, this formula looks closer to the
requirement of modicum of creativity rather than a mid-way solution. See Feist Publications
Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co 499 US 340 (1991); CCH Canada Ltd v The Law Society
of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR 339. For further illustration see also Interlego A/S v Exin-
Lines Bros SA (1989) 48(4) PD 133 (Israel); and Telstra Corporation Ltd v Desktop
Marketing Systems Pty Ltd [2001 ] FCA 612 (Australia).
Making creativity a condition for copyright protection has attracted ample criticism. See for
example, R VerSteeg, 'Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, 'Creativity', and The Legislative
History of the 1976 Copyright Act' (1995) 56 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 549; G
Pessach, 'The Legacy of Fiest Revisited: A Critical Analysis of the Creativity Requirement'
36 (2002) Israel Law Review 19; DJ Gervais, 'Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis
of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law' (2002) 49 Journal of the Copyright Society of
the USA 949; and by the same author, 'Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH' (2004) 18
Intellectual Property Journal 131.
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COPYRIGHT ENTITLEMENT STRUCTURE
A. The Role of Correlatives
A property right in respect of a given resource arms its owner, inter
alia, with a bundle of legal rights. The primary rights considered here are
three. Combined, these rights usually characterise the right to private
property: the right to use; the right to exclude others from use and
possession; and the power to transfer the owned object as a gift, by sale or
bequest. 
77
The right to exclude is the chief right of property holder's bundle of
rights. Once the right to exclude is combined with the right to use we get
the right that we aim at - the right to use our own land. As the defining
characteristic of private property, it is the right to exclude that chiefly
attracts our imagination. 78 In the words of Cohen: the 'essence' of property
'is always the right to exclude others.' 79 The right to exclude then, is the
right that transforms a right to an essentially private right. The right to
transfer, is subject to the availability of the right to exclude, and cannot be
independently realized. Only when an individual has a right to exclude
others from access or use of an asset, can he enjoy the freedom to exercise
the right to transfer his private property to others. Yet, the first two rights
will continue until varied by the right to transfer.80
77 I shall use the term 'rights' to denote the legal relations that a property right imposes.
The bundle of rights a property holder has includes more than those mentioned, but the three
rights that I am dealing with are the most fundamental and powerful. For example see
Honor6 (n 9 above). Cf, Mossoff (n 17 above), in particular 413-427.
78 The right to exclude may, to some extent, bring one to remark that although property
is about rights, there is still a certain form of relation between the owner and the resource.
This idea is nicely captured by Honor6 in the following passage: 'The idiom which directly
couples the owner with the thing owned is far from pointless; where the right to exclude
others exists, there is indeed (legally) a very special relation between the holder of the thing
and the thing'. Honord, ibid 106, 134.
79 M Cohen, 'Property and Sovereignty' (1928) 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 8, 12. Merrill
also writes that 'to the extent one has the right to exclude, then one has property; conversely,
to the extent one does not have exclusion rights, one does not have property.' TW Merrill,
'Property and the Right to Exclude' (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730, 753. Cf Mossoff
(n 17 above) 396. See also DL Callies and JD Breemer, 'The Right to Exclude Others from
Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right' (2000) 3 Washington University
Journal of Law and Policy 39; and LS Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and
Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 137-161.
Justice McKenna in 1913 put the matter this way: 'The conception of property is
exclusiveness, the rights of exclusive possession, enjoyment and disposition. Take away
these rights and you take all that there is of property. Take away any of them, force a
participation in any of them and you take property to that extent'. Justice J McKenna in Pipe
Line Cases, 234 US 548, 571 (1913).
80 There are exceptions to this general assertion. For example one can transfer a right to
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The realization of the three primary rights is affected by the intrinsic
relational character of the institution of private property. Property rights are
correlative in nature, since acquisition imposes duties on others.81 Hohfeld
attempts to provide us with the tools to analyse and understand the meaning
of having rights in terms of the correlative propositions about duty that they
entail. 82 Hohfeld devises a comprehensive legal taxonomy, comprising the
terms right, duty, privilege and power as categories of entitlements attached
to private property. 83 His great achievement is that his analysis compels us
to carefully calculate the spectrum of private ownership with respect to the
benefits of the rightholder against the burdensome duties these benefits
impose on non-owners. 84 Waldron explains this logic and asserts that:
It is always tempting to take the perspective of the right-bearer, and
show what a marvelous thing it is for him to have all these rights. They
protect and promote his personality. They vindicate his right to the
labor of his body. They reward his desert. They allow him to make
plans, and to exercise his autonomy. The virtue of the Hohfeldian
analysis is that it compels us to concentrate on the other side of the
use his land in the form of a positive easement such as right of way and there can be many
with rights over a single resource. In copyright, one can transfer his property in the object
but still retain the copyright, for example, when one writes a letter to a friend the friend have
property in the physical object (the paper) but not the copyright, unless he was assigned the
copyright. A thief will have neither; he would only have illegal possession.
81 In a well-known essay, Gibbard asserts: 'If a person owns a thing, his ownership
enhances his liberty, but it does so at the expense of the liberty of others. Ownership of a
thing gives a person the right to exclude others from its use, and that right, though it adds to
the freedom of the owner, detracts from the freedom of those others.' A Gibbard, 'Natural
Property Rights' in RM Stewart (ed.), Readings in Social and Political Philosophy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 237. In a later article, Gaus and Lomasky explain:
'Gibbard hereby points to a possible tension in a liberal case for private property. Once my
right to X is established, then I enjoy options with respect to the use or disposition of X that I
previously lacked. You, however, are now burdened by a correlative obligation to defer to
my decisions concerning X.' GF Gaus and LE Lomasky, 'Are Property Rights Problematic?'
(1990) 73(4) The Monist 483.
82 Hohfeld 1919 (n 38 above). See also Hohfeld's earlier article, 'Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16 (hereinafter -
'lHohfeld 1913').
83 For useful accounts on the Hohfeldian classification see J Waldron, 'Introduction' in J
Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 1, 4-9; and D
Knowles, Political Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2001) 138-154. Although Hohfeld did
not mention the term 'bundle of rights', he is claimed to have brought new understanding of
the term. See for example, CC Tedrowe, 'Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal
Circuit' (2000) 85 Cornell Law Review 586, 589; TW Merrill and HE Smith, 'The
Property/Contract Interface' (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 773, 780-783; Penner (n 43
above) 724-725.
84 There are many questions and conflicting philosophies around the principle of
ownership. Should ownership be recognised? What form of ownership should society prefer?
The concept of ownership is ruled out by definition. Yet, 'the possibility that no specific
form of ownership is justifiable, is a possibility to be taken seriously'. JO Grunebaum,
Private Ownership (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987) 24.
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coin: the correlative duty.
85
Hohfeld tells us that if an individual has a right over a certain
resource, then there will always be a duty attached to that right on those
who do not hold the right. A justified property right over a given resource is
the calculation of the three primary rights and the duties they impose on
others. For this calculation process, Hohfeld identifies eight basic legal
relations, which he arranges in two tables of 'jural opposites' and 'jural
correlatives' 86 and argues that proprietary interests must be decomposed
into their constituent elements: rights, privileges, powers and immunities. 87
The most important and powerful of these is the correlative right/duty.
Hohfeld argues that 'even those who use the word [right] and the
conception 'right' [or claim] in the broadest possible way are accustomed to
thinking of 'duty' as the invariable correlative.' 88 In property, to have a
Hohfeldian right means that there are at least two players in the game: the
right-bearer and the duty-bearer. The entitlements of each are correlative:
'... if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the
correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off
the place.' 89 Thus, every question pertaining to private property is actually
a question of restraints.
The right in the context of property is particularly attractive since it
applies to a claim directed against the entire world. This is probably one of
the first axioms introduced to the law student in any introductory course on
property law. This right is known as right in rem, as opposed to right in
personam, which is directed at a single person. A good example is the
difference between a promise to an individual to provide him with my
lecture notes, and the right I have 'against the world' that no-one will take
my bag in order to secure the notes. Every non-owner of my property is
under a duty not to use, damage or destroy it.
How do the four pairs of rights/correlatives operate in law? Consider
the example of a plot of land. Prior to acquisition, we are all in the same
situation. Each of us has a privilege to use the land. The fact that an
85 Waldron 1993 (n 33 above) 844.
86 Hohfeld 1913 (n 81 above) 16. Hohfeld's construction attracted criticism from legions
of commentators. See for example, J Singer, 'The Legal Right Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld' (1982) Wisconsin Law Review 975, 986-95, 1049-
1050; and Gordon 1989 (n 21 above).
I agree that Hohfeld's construction clarifies the difference between a right (or claim) and a
privilege (or liberty) in a very useful way. Yet, no matter how articulate it is in helping us to
understand the inevitable costs of entitlements, is it at all possible to confine legal rights to a
conclusive list?
87 The four categories of rights and their correlatives are right(claim)/duty; privilege/no-
right; power/liability; immunity/disability.
88 Hohfeld 1919 (n 38 above) 31.
89 Ibid.
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individual has a privilege to perform a given act indicates that it has not
been made the subject of a duty so far. Once the individual has exercised his
privilege, he can perhaps claim to be an original owner. By using his
powers to create this claim, the individual has transformed his privilege of
use to an exclusive right, which excludes others from possession and use of
the plot. The rightholder also enjoys immunity against other people altering
his privileges and rights by exercising their powers, and protection against
having unwanted goods foisted upon him. If the rightholder abandons the
plot, we may return to the starting point in which everyone has the privilege
to use the plot and the power to create rights over the land.90
Copyright laws specifically refer to the right to prevent others from
copying the work and limit certain uses. First, the idea of copyright as an
exclusive property right is as strong as the Hohfeldian right to exclude
others from doing with the work what otherwise they would have been
authorised to do. The right to authorise certain uses supplements this right
to exclude. Second, the different methods of use resemble Hohfeldian
privileges. The author has a privilege to use his work as the law specifies,
and if an author has the right to authorise others to use his work in certain
circumstances, the author has the power to transfer his set of entitlements in
the work, and to alter the legal status of a given work.
Finally, an author also enjoys Hohfeldian immunity. An author has
immunity against others imposing on him claims to use the work in certain
ways without his permission. He also holds immunity against third parties
using their powers to alter the rights and privileges he holds in his creation
without his permission. In copyright terms, a musician has a right to
exclude others from accessing or making adaptations of his composition, a
privilege to make and use the adaptations, a power to authorise others to
make adaptations and an immunity against others exercising their powers
and affecting the legal status of the original work and adaptations.
B. Rights of Exclusion
As mentioned above, the right to exclude is what usually characterises
and defines the true power of a private property right. In Hohfeldian and
copyright terms: if X has a right against Y prohibiting Y from copying his
screenplay, it means that Y has a correlative duty not to copy the
screenplay. If X has a duty toward Y, Y holds a right against X. In terms of
the right to exclude, the fact that X has a right to exclude others from
copying the screenplay entails that others hold a duty to refrain from
copying the screenplay without X's permission. The right to exclude is
90 Penner remarks that Hohfeld's system of correlatives, coupled with Honord's
ownership incidents, define the saying 'property is a bundle of rights'. Penner (n 43 above)
712.
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correlative to the duties that others - except the right-holder - undertake.
The consequence of this is simple: now, the right-holder can exercise his
right by requesting the government to compel the duty-holder to act in
accordance with the duty.
The primary rights constitute the copyright-holder's core bundle of
rights. As with tangible property, the most powerful right an author may
have is the right to exclude others from access and use of his works. As
Gordon remarks: 'Copyright's grant of exclusive rights thus most closely
parallels landowners' "right to exclude," for patent law gives proprietors
something more than a "right to exclude" and trademark and trade secret
law give something less. Copyright gives authors only what trespass law
gives landowners: Authors have the right to exclude others from what they
own.' 9 1 That is, the right to exclude guarantees that copying an author's
work without his permission amounts to an infringement of his copyright.
Violations of copyright may yield sanctions and remedies. A jazz
adaptation of one of Vanessa Mae's violin ensembles or a public
performance of the ensemble, requires her permission, otherwise the
performer may find himself liable for damages, criminal penalties and other
sanctions familiar to the property institution in general. However, since
copyright controls rights in the intangible parts of a creation, one may
correctly raise the issue that differences between tangibles and intangibles
may yield different results once an infringement of the right to exclude is at
stake. If I send a painting I painted to a friend, my friend owns the painting.
However, unless expressly authorised by me, he is restricted from
reproducing my work and distributing it amongst his friends. Similarly, if I
sold my work to the Del Prado museum in Madrid but the museum did not
purchase my copyright interest in the work, Del Prado is restricted from
making reproductions or postcards carrying my work without my
permission. 9
2
One then may identify two senses of ownership protecting a painting,
a sculpture or a phone directory. The first sense provides protection to the
physical form of an artistic work as a tangible entity, while the copyrighted
parts - the abstract entities, protectable under copyright laws - are the
second sense.93 Copyright law is designed to protect the right to exclude
91 Gordon 1989 (n 21 above) 1370. See also by the same author, 'A Property Right in
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property'
(1993) 12 Yale Law Journal 1533, 1552-1554.
92 For the same reasons a US court held that the owner of a Mark Twain manuscript is
not entitled to publish it because physical ownership does not mean that the elements
pertaining to copyright ownership were obtained. Chamberlain v Feldman, 300 NY 135, 89
NE 2d 863 (1949).
93 In other words, copyrights are 'quite distinct from any physical work which may
embody them and, for example, the transfer of a manuscript does not amount to a transfer of
the copyright in the work. Equally, an assignment of the copyright (or any of the other
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others from certain uses and enjoyment of the abstract entity of a
copyrighted work; uses that sometimes may well have nothing to do with
physicality. As Lord Chancellor Cottenham pointed out in an early case
involving a defendant who was not authorised to publish a catalogue listing
private etchings made by Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort: 'The
matter or thing of which the party has obtained knowledge, being the
exclusive property of the owner, he has a right to the interposition of this
Court to prevent any use being made of it, that is to say, he is entitled to be
protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which is exclusively
his.' 9 4 From a similar point of view, Gordon remarks that 'a copyright
owner's rights largely operate independently of the rules governing physical
ownership. Intellectual property is concerned not with entry or physical
interference but with forbidding specific uses of the work that may be quite
independent of physical touching. Nevertheless, this right, like the right at
the core of tangible property, can be viewed as a right of exclusion.' 95
Although physicality is less relevant to the idea of having a copyright,
encroachment into one's personal autonomy amounts to trespassing. Full
realization of an individual's expression of personality and his efforts
necessitate exclusion rights similar in strength to those governing traditional
property. Jurisdictions in which moral rights are more central to questions
of copyright ownership, would probably argue that the physicality issue is
moot, since we are not protecting a copyrighted work but rather an
expression of a person's personal identity. This distinction between the
corporeal and the incorporeal constituents of a copyrighted entity is
captured in Kant's distinction between a 'real right' and a 'personal right'.
In What is a book? Kant identifies this distinction and claims that the
frequently found in our copyright thinking is that we confuse a 'real right'
with a 'personal right':
The basic cause of an appearance of legality in something that is
nevertheless, at the first inspection, such an injustice - as book piracy is -
lies in this: that the book is, on the one hand, a corporeal product of art
(opus mechanicum), which can be copied (by him, who finds himself in
legal possession of an exemplar of this product) - consequently has a real
right therein; on the other hand, however, a book is also merely an address
property rights) does not carry with it ownership of any physical article embodying the
right...' Laddie (n 24 above) 22.2. See also Re Dickens [1935] Ch 267, CA; Moorhouse v
Angus & Robertson No I Pty Ltd [1980] FSR 231.
94 Lord Cottenham LC in Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac And G 25 (emphasis
added).
95 Gordon 1989 (n 21 above) (emphasis added) 1368. It is arguable then that the right to
exclude in copyright is best definable as a 'right of enjoyment', or 'the right to exclude
others from enjoyment'. The above shows that in copyright, the right to exclude, is a mixture
of the other two primary rights, and they should be read in tandem.
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of the publisher to the public, which this publisher, without having the
authorization thereto of the author, may not publicly repeat (praestatio
operae) - a personal right; and now the error consists in this, that the two
are confused with each other.
96
In other words a book is a corporeal object of art which I hold when I
read. This denotes a 'real right'. A book is also the address by one person to
another person. According to Kant, an author can authorise use to others,
but can never alienate his personal right.97 Palmer explains: '[a] copier, or
infringer, offers to the public the thoughts of another, the author. That is, he
speaks in the author's name which he can properly do only with his
permission. The author has given permission, however, only to his
authorized publisher, who is wronged when a book edition is pirated.' 98
C. Privileges of Use
A privilege is a right of use. 99 The right to exclude others from using
or interfering with my property is not the same as the right to use the
property. The right to use a property is not a [claim] right simply because it
does not in itself impose duties on others.' 00 A privilege (or liberty) is
defined as the opposite of a duty and its correlative is 'no-right'. A privilege
to do an act amounts to the absence of a duty not to do that act. If X has the
right that Y should not encroach onto his Blackacre, X himself has a
privilege to enter; he is not under a duty to stay off the land and if he
wishes, he has a privilege to build an amusement park on his land in the
outskirts of his hometown. Once municipal authorities have approved the
project, the privilege is crystallized, and other people have no right to
prevent X from exercising his desire to build this park for the exclusive use
of orphans.
Privileges are not unlimited and an owner has to take account of
96 E Kant, Was ist ein Buch?', in Die Metaphysik Die Sitten (T Palmer trans., W
Weischedel ed., 1977) 405, cited in TG Palmer, 'Are Patents and Copyrights Morally
Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects' (1990) 13 Harvard Journal
of Law and Public Policy 817, 839-840.
97 E Kant, 'Von der Unrechtsmaissigkeit des Buichemachdrucks' in Copyrights and
Patents for Inventions (R MacFie ed. 1883) vol 2, 580, 582, cited in Palmer, ibid 839. 840-
841. Of importance to note is that for Kant the key issue in copyright is speech. Thus,
translations or derivative works cannot be prohibited because they do not amount to the very
speech of the author albeit the thoughts might be similar. Palmer, ibid 840-841.
98 Ibid 839.
99 That includes the privilege to not use.
100 'Second, A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
the land, harming the land, etc., that is within the limits fixed by law on grounds of social
and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases; and
correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons.'
Hohfeld 1919 (n 38 above) 96.
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possible repercussions.' 0 1 In addition, there are situations in which
strangers/non-rightholders may have a right of passage in X's land in
emergencies. 'I have a privilege' or 'it's my property' then, is no defence in
all circumstances. It is possible to conclude then, that X's privilege to use
his land is limited by duties the owner may have to the public. The term
'liberty' may further explain this: the right to use is correlative to a negative
proposition in respect of the duties of the right-holder. Although X's
privilege may also be accompanied by a duty on others not to interfere, that
does not mean that every liberty that X may have will be supported by a
right. Others may also have liberties that can exist simultaneously. In
copyright, non-rightholders always retain a privilege to use the underlying
idea of a given expression, and, as I shall argue, the law recognises
principles such as fair dealing exceptions and the public interest defence,
which make limitations and emergency situations in copyright disputes
easier to inflict on rightholders.
I have already mentioned that in copyright the right to exclude is
intertwined with the right to use. In this respect, another inherent difference
between a privilege of use in tangibles and in copyright should also be
noted. A copyrighted work, once its terms of protection have expired,
becomes part of the public domain. Members of the public now share the
same privilege of use. With tangibles, a lost or abandoned product can
receive a new owner, while once a copyrighted work becomes part of the
public domain, it remains there. 102 True, another creator can make it part of
his new work, but he cannot exclude others from making the same use
whether as a basis for new creations or mere enjoyment.
D. Powers of Transfer
In addition to having rights and privileges, owners have powers. A
power denotes an owner's ability to alter legal relations and transfer his
legal interest to another. 10 3 For example, an owner of a plot of land has the
101 If, for example, the land on which the amusement park is to be built is contaminated
with asbestos, then a court may inquire into the proper use of the given piece of land and the
eventual effects on those who are likely to use the facilities of the park. It might even inquire
into the decision making process of the municipal authority as to how this privilege was
authorised without noticing the environmental and public health risks. Only when the land
becomes his, the owner can exercise his right to exclude.
102 This situation should be distinguished from remote situations where people bequeath
their property to the public, for example, making their home a public museum.
103 'Third, A has the legal power to alienate his legal interest to another, ie., to extinguish
his complex aggregate of jural relations and create a new and similar aggregate in other
person; also the legal power to create a life estate in another and concurrently to create a
reversion in himself; also the legal power to create a privilege of entrance in any other
person by giving 'leave and license'; and so on indefinitely. Correlative to all such legal
powers are the legal liabilities in other persons - this meaning that the latter are subject
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power to create rights [claims] over a given resource, and consequently to
introduce duties to be respected by others. How can we, however, prevent a
non-owner from using his powers to change the legal status of a resource
owned by X? In order to answer this question Hohfeld introduces
immunities as the last category of his rights. 104 Immunity is to be viewed in
two ways: first, every person has immunity against other people imposing
property claims on him without his permission. Second, every person has
immunity against other people using their powers to alter the rights and
privileges he has without his permission.
The right to transfer is a Hohfeldian power. As with tangible property,
an author would be able to exercise his right to transfer only when he has a
right to exclude others from a given work. Yet, the divisibility of
copyrighted works complicates attainment of the right to transfer: a film,
for example, is composed of the screenplay, the choreography, the sound
track, etc. Treating a copyrighted work as an entity comprising different
elements that are subject to separate copyright protection, widens the scope
for possible manipulations of the right to exclude. At the same time,
however, it introduces complexities that the law of copyright has to
accommodate. Finally, in general terms, like traditional tangible property,
in copyright, the right to use and the right to exclude continue, until varied
by the right to transfer, abandoned or destroyed. Continuation of these
rights, of course, is determined by the temporal nature of copyright
protection. 105
nolens volens to the changes of jural relations involved in the exercise of A's powers.'
Hohfeld 1919 (n 38 above) 96.
104 'Fourth, A has an indefinite number of legal immunities, using the term in the very
specific sense of non-liability or non-subjection to a power on the part of another
person.. .Correlative to all these immunities are the respective legal disabilities of the
persons in general.' lbid 96-97.
105 To clarify, I argue that rights can be shared with others, against others, or from others:
while a privilege is shared with others whose correlative is no right. A right to exclude is
against others whose correlative is a duty upon others. For example, before one expresses
one's artistic ideas, the ideas form part of the common of all and each of us has a privilege to
consume as many ideas as he wishes. The effort in expressing them in a tangible medium is
what distinguishes between a privilege that all have and a right that only the right-holder has.
From that moment the right to exclude is present, and the author enjoys a right to copy and
reproduce the work which is a right enforceable against others. At the same time, the author
enjoys a rightfrom others, which means (i) the capacity to keep stable existing legal relations
or to create new relations, and (ii) the capacity to stop anyone from imposing legal relations
without permission. The right to transfer does not involve placing duties on others. It is not a
right in the sense that the right to exclude is, and is dependent on the existence of the two
preceding rights. However, whether a right shared with others - a common privilege to use
and consume unprotectable artistic and authorial commodities - suffices for matters of
copyright balance remains an open question.
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E. Copyright-Limitation Rules
Like every property system, copyright should be demarcated carefully.
In addition to the bundle of rights, copyright laws claim to establish a solid
bundle of limitations of the rights. These limitations provide rightholders
civil and criminal remedies on the one hand, and designed to accommodate
fundamental societal needs on the other hand. However, the question is
whether the degree to which the 'bundle of limitations' incorporated in
copyright law, adequately satisfies the concerns I expressed above about the
uncontrollable dimension of private rights in copyright.
The idea of establishing a property right was not the only import from
traditional property into copyright. Certain norms of justice, set in property
laws and crafted by judicial decisions, continually shape copyright
ownership patterns. However, the lack of a universally accepted definition
of property - as opposed to the universal recognition of a person's right to
own property 10 6 - or a universally accepted recognition of one definition of
copyright, 10 7 dictates that jurisdictional differences will continue to
determine the fate of the right. There are, however, certain limitation rules
that are universally attributed to private property and were adapted, with
variations, to copyright.
A key limitation in common law systems, with a clear impact on the
evolution of property limitation rules, is the tort of nuisance. The rule limits
landowner's primary rights if their realization causes certain unlawful
harms to his neighbours. 108 A plaintiff, in order to invoke this rule will have
to show 'not only that he has sustained damage, but that the defendant has
caused it by going beyond what is necessary in order to enable him to have
the natural use of his land.'109 That is, 'if the user is reasonable, the
106 See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 17(1) and Article
17(2); The African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) Article 14; The American
Convention on Human Rights (1969) Article 21(1); Not surprisingly, endless controversies
resulted in non-inclusion of a right of property in the European Convention on Human
Rights (Article I of Protocol 1 includes a right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions).
107 There are many international and regional agreements aiming to harmonise copyright.
For example, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886
(Paris Act, 1971); The Universal Copyright Convention 1952 (Paris Act, 1971); WIPO
Copyright Treaty 1996, and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (known
together as 'WIPO Internet Treaties'). There are also regional arrangements such as the
Directives of the European Union and the Inter-American copyright agreements; and trade
arrangements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the TRIPs
Agreement. In addition, there are international agreements regulating neighbouring rights.
For a comprehensive overview of international copyright law and policy, see P Goldstein,
International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2001); and GB Dinwoodie, WO Hennessey and S Perlmutter, International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy (New York: M Bender, 2001).
108 This rule is known as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
109 Brett U in West Cumberland Iron and Steel Company v Kenyon [1879] 11 Ch D 782,
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defendant will not be liable for consequent harm to his neighbour's
enjoyment of his land.' 110
The principle of no-harm is well ingrained in copyright policy and
affects both authors and users. It holds that for an author to part from his
laborious efforts and elements of personality infused into the work created,
or from the other side of the fence, to withhold from the public to do certain
acts with protected copyrighted entities, amount to violation of the no-harm
principle. The no-harm principle normally applies to individuals but it has a
social function. For example, just as environmental conservation rules
impose radical restrictions on the use of privately owned land in order to
avoid harming the environment, which in turn secures collective benefits
for society as a whole, so copyright aims to balance the no-harm for the
public and the no-harm to the author.
Examples of invocations of property-limitation rules illustrate
prevailing trends in copyright protection. In two historic cases on property
the House of Lords declines to recognise a person's 'right to light' 1 I or to
grant an injunction against obstruction of water flow to waterworks, even
when it was established that a malicious act was carried out in order to force
the plaintiff to buy the land at a higher price: 'He prefers his own interest to
the public good. He may be churlish, selfish, and grasping. His conduct
may seem shocking to a moral philosopher. But where is the malice?
1 12
Analogously, I shall argue that copyright laws also blatantly allow one to
prefer his own interest over the public good. If the 'right to light' is
comparable to a fundamental right to consume social and cultural wealth
vested in copyrighted entities, then copyright laws decline to protect this
right also by limiting the strength of limitation rules. A question which I
shall leave open in this Article is how much copyright laws should allow an
author or an artist to be 'churlish, selfish, and grasping'?
Another example concerns the rights of members of the public to pass
and repass a road dedicated as a highway, even though the highway is
privately owned. The English Court of Appeal has limited this right to pass
787.
110 Lord Goff in Cambridge Wanter Co v Eastern Countries Leather Plc [1994] 2 AC
264, 299. Further, according to the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, it is possible to deny an owner
some use of his land if that use causes harm to his neighbours: 'the person who for his own
purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes must keep it at his peril.' Blackburn J in Rylands v Fletcher [1966] Exch 265, 279.
111 Taplin v Jones (1865) 11 HLC 290, 329, reversed in Coils v Home & Colonial Stores
Ltd [1904] AC 179 (HL). In Phipps v Pears Lord Denning MR relied on Taplin v Jones and
held that '[e]very man is entitled to pull down his house if he likes. If it exposes your house
to the weather, that is your misfortune. It is no wrong on his part.' Lord Denning MR in
Phipps v Pears [19651 1 QB 76, 83.
112 Lord MacNaughten in Mayor and Corporation of Bradford v Pickles [1895] AC 587,
600-601.
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the highway and entitled the owner to an injunction to prevent a racing tout
from walking up and down the highway in order to make notes about race
horses being trained on the plaintiff's adjoining land. Romer U remarks
that: 'The soil of the highway belonging to the plaintiff he has a right to ask
for what purpose the defendant entered on to it, whether for the purpose of
using it in the ordinary and reasonable way in which a highway may be
used or for the purpose of doing that which amounted to an interference
with the plaintiff's legal use of his own land.' 13 In copyright, passing and
repassing have a different meaning, which lies at the heart of copyright. As
an abstract commodity, a copyrighted work is different from 'the soil of the
highway'. On the one hand, the distinction between protectable and non-
protectable material allows non-owners to enter into rightholders' private
realm. On the other hand, this distinction explains why it is more
convenient to avoid the public interest and leave the public to enjoy the less
valuable - non-protectable - elements.
There are several immediate, and unconditional limitations on a
copyright: the idea/expression dichotomy; the non-substantial part
principle; the fair dealing doctrine; and the duration of the right. The most
important copyright limitation rule stems from the idea/expression
dichotomy. Because of this distinction, literary, musical and dramatic
works, choreography, graphic, audiovisual and pictorial works, motion
pictures, sound recording and architectural works are protectable subject-
matter. Systems, schemes, facts, concepts, methods, principles and ideas are
not protected. 1 14 For example, ideas and facts relating to environmental
disasters and large-scale atrocities in a bio-chemical war or a Civil War
family besieged by the terrors and hardships of internecine conflict are not
protectable under copyright. Similarly, the claim of a painter to own ideas
to spread upon canvass stories from the Bible, or a poet who inspires
students to write on how to instruct mankind to appreciate the beauty of
nature, are beyond the scope of copyright's cluster of proprietary
entitlements. Their expression in a book, film, street show or graffiti, are
copyrightable. In other words, copyright transforms common conceptions
and ideas into property, making it a right against the copying of a defined
transformative form of ideational entities.
To the non-protectable nature of ideas one should also add the
principle of non-substantial part, according to which a non-owner is
allowed to copy non substantial parts from other works, make them part of
113 Romer U in Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752, 759.
114 As Lindley LI once remarked: 'Copyright...does not extend to ideas, or schemes, or
systems, or methods; it is confined to their expression, and if their expression is not copied
the copyright is not infringed.' See for example, Hollinrake v Truswell (1894) 3 Ch 420,
427.
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his new creation and claim copyright over the whole work.1 15 In this way
the law guarantees that exercise of an author's bundle of rights is not
absolute, or better put - is always open in character and vulnerable for use
by fellow non-owners. The non-substantial part principle, like the
idea/expression dichotomy, provides users an immediate right to acquire
from a work aspects which the law does not protect.
The duration of the right, not only distinguishes copyright from
tangible property for which perpetuity plays a significant role, but also
limits maximisation of the enjoyment of the bundle of rights. This
limitation has been the subject of great criticism and contention between
partisans of perpetual rights and those who believe copyright systems
should be abolished all together. 116 Protection of the economic and moral
115 The fact that an author has added enough skill, labour and judgement to secure
protection to his efforts does not settle the question whether he has infringed copyright or
not. The issue is whether a substantial part of the plaintiff's work survives in the defendant's
so as to appear to be a copy of it. See for example Redwood Music v Chappell (n 50 above);
and Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams Textiles Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2416 (HL).
The principle of substantial part is particularly difficult when applied to satire or music. For
example in Glyn v Weston Feature a film burlesque of Elinor Glyn's novel, Three Weeks,
was found not to infringe copyright since very little was taken from the novel and also in an
incidental way. Glyn v Weston Feature [1916] 1 Ch 261. Another example is the Joy Music
case in which it was held that one repeated phrase of a parodied song in pursuit of Prince
Philip is not substantial enough to constitute substantial part and hence an infringement act.
Joy Music v Sunday Pictorial [1960] 2 QB 60. See also Newspaper Licensing Agency v
Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 WLR 290, 296-298; and Rowling v Uitgeverij Byblos BV
[2004] ECDR 7 (the Netherlands).
See generally, M Gredley, 'Parody: A Fatal Attraction?' (1997) European Intellectual
Property Review 339; M Spence, 'Intellectual Property and the Problem of Parody' 114
[1998] Law Quarterly Review 594; and A Bridy, 'Sheep in Goat's Clothing: Satire and Fair
Use After Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc.' (2004) 51 Journal of the Copyright Society of
the USA 257.
116 Extending the duration of copyright protection, Vaidhyanathan remarks 'has
jeopardized the idea/expression dichotomy, public domain, fair use, open access to
information, and the ability to fre'ely satirize, parody, or comment on an existing work... [the
Congress] was finally willing to "grant far more" than... we need'. S Vaidhyanathan
Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens
Creativity (New York and London: New York University Press, 2001) 80.
Assuming there is a general understanding that authors should be protected during their
lifetime and for a limited period after their death, the question remains, how long should the
period of copyright protection last? The Whitford Committee criticised the duration of
copyright for its arbitrary allocation of rights: 'The development of copyright law in this and
other countries and the acceptance of obligations under international conventions has made it
virtually impossible to deal with term on a logical basis.' Cmnd 6732, para. 41.
On the term protection see generally, SL Stanley, 'A Dangerous Step Toward the Over
Protection of Intellectual Property: Rethinking Eldred v. Ashcroft' (2003) 26 Hamline Law
Review 679; MP Schwartz and WM Treanor 'Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property' (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal
2331; C Seville, 'Copyright's Bargain - Defining Our Terms' [2003] 3 Intellectual Property
Quarterly 312; and M Jones, 'Eldred v Ashcroft: The Constitutionality of the Copyright
Term Extension Act' (2004)19 Berkeley Technology and Law Journal 85.
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rights in a copyrighted work lasts 70 years 'from the end of the calendar
year in which the author dies'. 1 17 This rule ensures that works will
eventually reside in the public domain.
A controversial category of immediate limitation imposed on
copyright owners are the exceptions composing the fair dealing doctrine. 118
This doctrine is but a zero-price compulsory license on copyrighted works
for particular uses identified by the law, so that certain acts do not amount
to an infringement of copyright even though the author's permission was
not granted. These acts include inter alia, use for research or private
study 119; criticism, review and news reporting 120; other different uses
(preparation for instruction, playing or showing) for teaching and
educational purposes 121; use by libraries and archives 1 22 ; and also
incidental inclusion. 123 In Hohfeldian terms, in these situations the user has
a complete privilege (correlative to a compulsory license). Also, one could
argue that a user has a temporary, and strictly defined, right to use, while
the copyright owner has a duty to allow such use. These limitations are so
central to the legitimacy of the copyright system as they seek to establish a
proper balance between the legitimate rights of copyright owners and the
legitimate public interests.
The fair dealing doctrine is an exhaustive list of limitations built into
the law. It does not aid the public in certain ad hoc situations or
emergencies. Most jurisdictions give the public privileges to act reasonably
in emergency situations, despite the fact that exercising this privilege may
cause intrusive harm to someone's private property. In other words, owners
of a piece of land are not absolutely entitled to withhold others from
causing unintentional and non-negligent harms to the land. In those
situations, a stranger has a temporary power to alter the legal status of the
owner's right over the land. The latter temporarily loses his right of
exclusion, and consequently the stranger may enter the land. It is important
to highlight that the stranger has the right to use the owner's land and to
117 CDPA 1988 s 12(2). Under CDPA 1988 s 86(2), moral rights will continue to exist so
long as copyright subsists in the given work. This do not include a situation where the rights,
pursuant to s 87, have been waived. To this rule there are certain exceptions. For example,
CDPA 1988 s 86(2) provides that the right to false attribution recognised pursuant to s 84,
will last 20 years after the person's death.
118 CDPA 1988 Chapter Il 'Acts Permitted in Relation to Copyright Works'. Chapter III
complies with the list of exceptions and limitations provided under Article 5 of Directive
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (22 May 2001).
119 CDPA 1988 s 29.
120 CDPA 1988 s 30.
121 CDPA 1988 s 32-36A.
122 CDPA 1988 s 37-44.
123 CDPA 1988 s 31.
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only temporarily limit the owner's right to exclude. Copyright law is not
silent with regards to emergencies and recognises a common law defence of
public interest, 124 which although incorporated into copyright law, is an
independent defence that is not limited to copyright. Although severely
limited in scope and application, it allows courts a wider interpretive space
where codified laws cannot solve specific situations. 125
Another set of limitation rules is expropriation rules. The functions
served by these rules are diverse and they live up to the maxim that 'justice
has inevitable costs'. 126 These rules govern situations in which an owner's
rights can be taken away from him against his will. For example, in private
law, one's property may be stripped away as a means of enforcing payment
of debts in civil execution or through bankruptcy procedures. Criminal law
provides sanctions by ways of fines and confiscation. Under the doctrine of
proprietary estoppel, courts may divest owners of property in favour of
those who have relied on expectations generated by the owner's conduct.
Finally, states exercise the power to tax money and other property owned
by their citizens. Courts, however, have recognised that 'the taking of a
person's land against his will is a serious invasion of his proprietary rights',
and therefore 'the use of statutory authority for the destruction of those
rights requires to be most carefully scrutinized...
This approach towards expropriation rules shape similar modes in
copyright. A search order or injunction for the freezing or retention of
assets, were designed primarily to help the plaintiff amass evidence of
infringement. The Anton Piller Order, for example, is a procedure that
enables the plaintiff to inspect the defendant's premises and to seize
materials relevant to the alleged claim of infringement of copyright without
124 CDPA 1988 s 171(3).
125 See for example, Beloff v Pressdram [1973] RPC 783; Lion Laboratories v Evans
(1984) 2 All ER 417; Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2000] 3 WLR 215.
Although the scope of the public interest defence is limited, in the Ashdown Case the Court
criticised Aldous L's decision in Hyde Park. The case concerns a copyright claim in the
minutes of a secret meeting held between the Prime Minister and the former leader of the
Liberal Democratic Party, Paddy Ashdown. The Court of Appeal was asked to examine the
fair dealing and common law public interest defences for infringement of copyright in light
of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Court held: 'We do not consider that Aldous LI was
justified in circumscribing the public interest defence to breach of copyright as tightly as he
did. We prefer the conclusion of Mance LI that the circumstances in which public interest
may override copyright are not capable of precise categorisation or definition. Now that the
Human Rights Act is in force, there is the clearest public interest in giving effect to the right
of freedom of expression in those rare cases where this right trumps the rights conferred by
the Copyright Act. In such circumstances, we consider that section 171(3) of the Act permits
the defence of public interest to be raised.' Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] Ch 149,
170; Hyde Park, ibid 238-9. See also J Griffiths, 'Copyright Law after Ashdown - Time to
Deal Fairly with the Public' [2002] 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly 240.
126 Harris (n 3 above) 279.
127 Watkins LI in Prest v Secretary of State for Wales (1982) 81 LGR 193, 211.
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notice. 128 In addition, copyright laws, subject to specified conditions,
enable injunctions for the freezing or retention of assets. This interlocutory
procedure is known as the Mareva injunction, 129 directed not for the
discovery and preservation of 'fragile' evidence, but for the retention of
assets that belong to the defendant. As a self-help remedy it is invaluable
for the success of an action against infringement. Finally, other laws impose
additional limitations on the ways one may use one's work. For example,
defamation laws prohibit an author from publishing a story that maligns
someone falsely, anti-pornography laws limit distribution of certain works,
and limits are also placed for ways of disseminated copyrighted works over
the media. The law also invalidates contracts regarding real and personal
property should they counter public policy.
IV.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that copyright is a form of property, and although it seems
parasitic on prevailing principles of traditional property, copyright systems
invented a distinct bundle of rights and fences which do not exist in the
realm of traditional property. Yet, no matter how similar one may conclude
traditional property and copyright rules to be, one may find scholars from
time to time asking: 'does it matter whether intellectual property is
property?'1 30 For reasons already discussed the answer must be affirmative.
It matters because copyright is property and should preserve incentives in
the guise of proprietary entitlements; but it also matters, because copyright,
despite its limited scope, has become an insensitive variant of traditional
property.
128 Anton Piller v Manufacturing Processes [1976] Ch 55; [1976] RPC 719. Civil
Procedure Act 1997, s 7.
129 See CBS United Kingdom v Lambert (19831 FSR 123 (CA).
130 Carter (n 20 above) 723.
